The development of agendas for cooperative action and the other
main centers of global power forming part 8 of the National
Security Strategy Report for the United States was submitted to US
congress by President Bush on September 27. The report focuses on
Russia, India and China, with China accounting for the larger
portion of the paper. The so-called "other main centers of global
power" refers to major powerful US allies including Europe and Asia
in the first group, and Russia, India and China in the second. The
US now regards Russia and India together with China indicating the
increasing importance of these two countries since Sept.11. This
article analyzes future developments in a study done on this
report. The sections concerning China fully demonstrate the
controversial nature of Bush's China policy, suggesting a
fundamental tendency for the US's China policy to maintain a
strategy of co-existing cooperation and confrontation.
On
the one hand, the report admitted, "The United States relationship
with China is an important part of our strategy to promote a
stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asian Pacific region. We welcome
the emergence of a strong, peaceful and prosperous China." On the
other hand, the report then goes on to say, "In pursuing advanced
military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the
Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in
the end, will hamper its own pursuit of national greatness."
According to the report, the US seeks a constructive relationship
with changing China and already cooperates well where the two
countries' interests overlap, such as on the war on terrorism, the
Korean Peninsula, health and environmental problems. In addition,
the report says "Sept.11 fundamentally changed the context for
relations between the United States and other main centers of
global power and opened vast, new opportunities with long-standing
allies in Europe and Asia, and with leaders of Russia, India and
China." The report recognizes the importance of China-US trade
relations by pointing to the fact that China is now their fourth
biggest trading partner with over US$100 billion in annual two-way
trade. However the report also emphasizes profound disagreements
with China, especially with regard to the US commitment to defend
Taiwan under the Taiwan Relation Act, but also on issues relating
human rights and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The
report considers critical the differences in political systems, yet
holds that "We will narrow difference where they exist, but not
allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree."
Against the backdrop of anti-terrorism and Iraqi, partly because
the US wants China's help in resolving Iraqi matter and partly
because this section of the report centers mainly on US cooperation
with the main centers of global power, the nature of China's threat
seem somewhat reduced. References to China in this report appear
less aggressive than those contained in a report by the US
military, issued by US defense ministry, and a report on US-China
trade relations which suggest a threat posed by China to US
security, issued by the US congress. Nevertheless, the new US cold
war approach towards China remains unchanged.
As
mentioned above, although the report sees cooperation between the
US and China on problems relating to anti-terrorism and some other
issues, it still maintains a fundamental judgment that Sept.11 has
not changed the nature of international relations in the East Asia
region. The war on anti-terrorism has not changed the balance of
power in East Asia. While the US devotes all its attention to
handling the Middle East crisis and Iraq, it continues to try to
maintain the status quo and reconfirm its promises to Taiwan.
Considering the fact that China's purported military threat to the
Asia-Pacific region is highlighted on page 27 of the report, and in
view of the basic tone of the report, "The US will never allow
other countries to surpass America's huge power and never allow
other countries challenge the US's unique superpower status in the
world," then the US's China policy is not at all what it asserts
itself to be in part 8 of the document.
Although non-state terrorist organizations have posed serious
threats to the security of all nations, including the US, this
report seems to focus on nation-centered threats toward the US. In
fact, it is understood that in Asia-Pacific region only China can
seriously challenge the US's future. Within this context, the
report actually regards China as a potential threat to the US,
saying "the US force will be strong enough to block any potential
enemy that seeks to surpass American military power or any attempts
to achieve equal supremacy." China perceives this comment as a
warning to itself.
The differences about China within the report reflect the
controversy inside the Bush administration. There are now so many
"new imperialists" in Pentagon, referring to themselves as "freedom
fighters and democracy warriors" who want to change US foreign
policy and the world itself. In this respect, so long as
differences between the political systems of China and the US
continue to exist, and as long as the rising trend of Chinese
economic and military strength persists, the conflict between China
and the new American imperialists could prove to be a long
story.
What's more, if these new imperialists are those who insist on
aggressive realism, as opposed to defensive realism, and persevere
in preventing perceived threats with pre-emptive measures, then
Sino-US relations may well face a new and significant crisis just
beyond the horizon, especially if relations deteriorate in the
Taiwan Straits.
Since the release of the report, international commentators view
the policy of pre-emptive strikes as a euphemism for the US giving
up traditional strategies of containment and deterrence. However,
we must note that while the report emphasizes a policy of first
strike, it still holds that America's military power must first
attempt to prevent threat posed to the US, its allies and its
friends. Even in the Bush administration, where many new
imperialists and aggressive realists occupy leading positions,
there are still a number of defensive realists who continue to
insist on the benefits of deterrence and containment. Obviously, US
containment and deterrence has not been completely replaced by the
notion of pre-emptive strikes. Instead, the two notions appear to
be operating along side one another. As for the US's China policy,
the old strategy of containment has not changed, but the notion of
a pre-emptive strike has been added to allow for developments which
may arise over the question of Taiwan.
The author, Pang Zhongying, is a well-known Chinese scholar at
the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(china.org.cn, translated by Zheng Guihong, October 18, 2002)